Genetically modified organisms have already escaped as a result of Adam Zaretsky’s art practice.  In 2001 he inadvertently released some “antennapedia” fruit flies—a common lab strain with legs growing out of their heads instead of antennae—triggering a heated debate on the campus of San Francisco State University, where he was a Visiting Professor.  After a firestorm of e-mails from the local University Animal Care and Use Committee, fruit fly geneticists from top laboratories weighed in on the situation.  “The mutation that causes the antennapedia phenotype, while induced by mutagenesis in the lab, can, in theory occur naturally in wild populations,” wrote Brad Jones from the NYU Medical School in an e-mail.  “You must realize that such a mutation is actually quite detrimental to the fly and will ultimately not propagate through the population, as a fly carrying such a mutation will be at a major disadvantage, and natural selection will quickly remove it.  In fly labs, flies get loose all the time.”  Chiming in on the same thread, John Locke of the University of Alberta wrote: “You can eat them and there is no danger.  We often find them in our coffee cups and sometimes not (it was too late - down they go)” (Zaretsky 2001). [Fig-6-A-Wild-Bioartist-510x256]_Adam Zaretsky has deliberately released mutant animals into the wild, bringing attention to the novel forms of life that are routinely escaping from laboratories. He has also created new forms of laboratory life. _ [Fig-7-Bipolar-Flowers-510x383] [https://aesengagement.files.wordpress.com/2016/07/fig-7-bipolar-flowers-510x383.jpg]Using the tools of molecular biology Zaretsky altered the growth patters of mustard plants. Radically different growth patterns emerged. Photographs courtesy of Adam Zaretsky and David Louwrier. Organisms routinely escape from established laboratories.  The controversy stirred up by Adam Zaretsky’s artwork brought attention to the fact that containment protocol for genetically modified organisms are far from perfect.  Government authorities are usually quick to intervene when risks to human health emerge from laboratory facilities.  When inspectors found live anthrax spores outside a US Army containment area in September 2015, the Department of Defense froze operations at nine biodefense laboratories where work is done on dangerous pathogens.  U.S. federal funding for synthetic biology prioritizes defense initiatives, but support for monitoring environmental risks lags far behind (Kuiken 2015).